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Abstract 
This chapter discusses pricing and other types of business practices by e-Procurement 
platforms such as offering free services, or bundling, from the perspective of the new 
economic literature on two-sided markets. This literature focuses on situations where a 
platform offer services involving externalities between two (or more) sides of the markets, 
which can be at the participation level or the usage level. Platforms need to attract both sides 
and to coordinate their behavior. In this context, competitive prices depart from costs, and 
involve cross-subsidies. This chapter presents insight derived from the literature on the pattern 
of this departure from “marginal cost pricing”, both in terms of tariffs charged to each sides, 
and in terms of the balance between subscription fees and transaction fees. It then discusses 
non-price instruments and incentive issues in the context of platforms. 
 
  
 
Introduction 
 The pace of innovation in information and communication technologies over the last 
decades had a dramatic impact for the organization of industries. Traditional vertical 
relationships are now challenged by new forms of electronic intermediation proposed by e-
marketplaces, exploiting the possibilities offered by Internet. Foreseen improvements in 
reliability, security and process innovation open the prospect for a complete reshaping of 
supply chain management via e-commerce. According to the European e-Business Report (e-
Business W@tch), in 2004 and based on the 5 largest EU countries, 23% of firms were buying 
more than 5% of their supply on-line. 11 % of the firms where using some e-marketplace for 
procurement with leading figures for ICT, transport equipment, chemicals or electronics.  
 Beyond these figures lies a huge diversity of situations with services ranging from 
simple search and matching services to fully integrated supply chain management. For 
instance eMarket Services (www.emarketservices.com) describes an e-marketplaces as "an 
aggregation of information portals, trading exchanges and collaboration tools".  This diversity 
comes along with an equally large attrition rates, highlighting the "winners-take-it-all" nature 
of the electronic intermediation activities. While there is a high rate of entry, few remains 
after some years, and the collapse of the Internet bubble reminds to all that profitability may 
not be at the initially expected level. To some extent these changes can be tracked back to a 
drastic change in the cost structure of intermediation, with a huge reduction in the variables 
costs of information processing. The reduction in costs comes along with a reduction in prices 
and an increase in the relative importance of scale economies as a driving force for market 
evolution. This evolution of cost cannot explain alone however the key features of the markets 
for electronic intermediation. A second consequence of the reduction in information 
processing costs and of the increase in the ability to manage complex systems is that it has 
created new scopes for interaction. In particular e-procurement allows to eliminate some 
bilateral relationships between buyers and the intermediary, or suppliers and the intermediary, 
and to replace them by electronically assisted direct negotiations between buyers and 
suppliers, in a new mix exploiting the best of intermediation and of direct vertical 
relationships. This highlights the role of the service as a communication platform as opposed 
to buy and resale services. Indeed most platforms attempt to shape the design of the service to 
improve the quality of interactions between participants.  Increased interactions between 
buyers and suppliers on e-marketplaces raise the importance of externalities between users of 
the service to such a level that it becomes crucial for success to understand their role. Indeed 
the value of communication being the joint outcome of the parties involved, each participant 
will care about the behaviour of the other potential participants. While this remark is trivial 
for system designers, it is also of great relevance for economic dimensions such as pricing. 
The reason is that, as prices affect the behaviour of economic agents, there is a potential for 
using them to induce efficient usage of the service. New marketplaces then design complex 
pricing schemes with different prices targeted to different activities (membership fees, 
transaction fees, options…) or different actors (buyers, suppliers, advertisers, privileged 
buyer,..). Moreover they also rely on non-price instruments such as free services, gifts… 
 
Two-sided markets and e-Procurement 
 These market developments has bring to the forefront of research in economics the 
analysis of intermediation services such as e-procurement, auction houses, matching 
services…. These services are part of a broader range of activities that economists include in 
the concept of two-sided platforms.1  To build on a definition that I used in another paper, the 
concept refers to "situations where one or several competing platforms provide services that 
are used by two types of partners to interact and operate an exchange". This includes e-
procurement platforms, but also activities as diverse as exchanges, credit cards, shopping 
malls, dating agencies or operating systems. They all have in common that one can identify 
two sides of the markets, that the value creation requires the two sides and that each side can 
receive a specific treatment.2 This new perception of the nature of the business is clear from 
the following statement by Jeff Bezos (CEO, Amazon.com): 3
"Ultimately we're an information broker. On the left side we have lots of products; on 
the right side we have lots of customers. We're in the middle making the connections. The 
consequence is that we have two sets of customers: consumers looking for books and 
publishers looking for consumers. Readers find books or books find readers." 
 While there remains much to understand about these markets, which all have their 
specificity, some recent progress has been made by economists in their understanding of their 
two-sided nature, in particular concerning pricing strategies and efficiency, as well as some 
other aspects such as bundling, vertical integration and anti-trust issues. The object of this 
chapter is to present some of these results and their implications.  
 Launching a successful e-procurement service requires to solve the classical chicken 
and egg problem. A downstream firm will be willing to rely on the service for its supplies 
only if it is confident that it will find an adequate offer. On the other hand securing the offer 
requires convincing suppliers that their investment in the relationship with the platform will 
meet adequate demand for their products. The key difficulty is then to start the process, to get 
one side "on board". This calls for specific pricing strategies that differ from strategies 
followed in more conventional businesses. Before turning to that, it is worth discussing the 
underlying logic.  
 
The dual nature of the customers of a platform 
 As any other business, platforms sell a service to customers who pay in order to access 
the platform. However the nature of the economic transaction involved is slightly different 
                                                 
1 General presentations are provided by Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2004a), “Two-Sided Market: an Overview”, 
IDEI Working Paper, or Jullien B. (2005), "Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries", CESifo 
Economic Studies, 51, 2-3, 235–262. For a friendly introduction to two-sided markets, see Evans D. and R. 
Schmalensee, "The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms", forthcoming in Issues in 
Competition Law and Policy, W. D. Collins ed., American Bar Association. 
2 Clearly, they can be more than two sides involved. Focusing on two sides simplifies the reasoning but the 
principles apply to multi-sided markets. 
3 Quoted in Leadership Online: Barnes & Noble vs. Amazon.com", Harvard Business School (1998), page 11. 
than in more conventional lines of business. In a typical exchange, the consumer is not 
involved in the production process that is carried on by the firm. The payment then 
remunerates the firm who buys inputs on other markets. In the case of a platform, the product 
is the outcome of the interaction between the customers of the platform. The traditional 
distinction between the input of the production process and the output becomes to some extent 
irrelevant. When two economic agents A and B use a platform to conduct a transaction, a key 
service that the platform offers to agent A is the access to agent B, and vice versa. The agent 
A is thus a customer willing to pay to access to B through the platform, but at the same time, 
the operator of the platform should be aware that the willingness to pay of agent B is 
determined by the participation of agent A to the process. Following this logic, a customer of 
a platform is both a client buying a service and an input for the service offered to other clients.  
 This dual nature of the customer is key to understand the specificities of the pricing 
strategies followed by platform, as well as other business practices such a bundling of 
services, exclusivity rules, free services ….For instance, while traditional monopoly pricing 
results from a trade-off between increasing the margin and reducing the volume of sales, this 
is not the case  for platforms as we shall develop below. This leads to a different approach to 
the relationship between the firm and its clients. Instead of just asking "what can I bring to the 
client that has some value to him?", the firm should also enquire "what value can the client 
bring to other clients?".  
 For instance, one consequence of this greater interest for coordination with clients is 
that one should expect more vertical integration for platforms which is indeed the case: there 
are numerous cases of platforms owned by their customers or by not-for-profit association set-
up by users. For instance VISA is not-for-profit association, members being the banks issuing 
credit cards; NYSE is a not-for-profit corporation controlled by 1366 “regular members”.  
 
Balancing the tariffs 
 As we shall see, the price structure has to be assessed globally (including participation 
fees and transaction fees) and may involve some form of cross-subsidy. 
For the moment, let us focus in the total tariff charged to each side to set some general 
principles. For the sake of clarity think about prices as charged for participating to the 
platform activity (although one can develop similar reasoning when the tariff is affected by 
the level of activity).  Prices reflect the price-elasticity of demand but also the extent to which 
the participation of the customer is valued by others. Typically raising the participation of one 
side through lower prices allows raising the price charged to the other side without affecting 
its participation level.  This has several consequences for pricing.  
   
  First considering a non-profit platform, the standard marginal cost pricing rule 
for efficient usage of a facility doesn't apply. If the platform set prices for suppliers equal to 
the marginal cost of servicing them, suppliers will participate up to the level where their 
benefit equates this cost. However they will not account for the extra benefits that buyers on 
the platform derive from their participation. In the context of a platform that is not subject to 
congestion, the consequence is that at prices equal to marginal costs, the level of participation 
of each side is too low. If this is achievable, the optimal price structure would require setting 
all prices below marginal cost. 
 
Subsidizing both sides occurs for instance for platforms that are free of charge and 
financed by governmental organizations, such as AcquistinRete (www.acquistinretepa.it) , the 
marketplace set up by Consip, that aims at providing goods and services to the public 
administrations in Italy.  
 
This conclusion reflects the fact that there are positive externalities between 
participants and must be tempered in general for two reasons. First there may be congestion or 
other types of negative externalities (for instance suppliers may prefer to face little 
competition). Second this means that the platform would operate at a loss which implies that 
it receives a subsidy, usually from the government.  
 
Given that such subsidies generate bureaucratic costs, tax distortions and 
organizational inefficiencies, an alternative is to rely on tariffs that balance the budget. Still, 
even for tariffs that balance the budget some price will typically remain below marginal cost. 
For a budget balanced platform, it is not the case that each customer should be charged an 
amount that covers the cost of its participation. The reason is that rebalancing the tariff in 
favor of one side of the market, thus with a small subsidy, may benefit all participants. 
Raising the participation of suppliers to the platform through subsidy requires increasing the 
fees paid by buyers so as to cover the total cost. But they may be willing to pay this extra 
amount if the benefits they derive from the increase in the participation level of suppliers 
more than compensate them for the extra payment. This is similar to other network situations, 
although here there are different types of customers and it is rather easier to identify the 
nature of the externality, being participation or usage.  
 The resulting price structure is thus one involving cross-subsidies between 
participants. 
 
For instance, eBay doesn’t charge buyers to participate to an auction. Implicitly this 
corresponds to a small subsidy (although the variable cost in this case is very small). On the 
other hand it charges complex tariff to suppliers. The supplier must pay a fee when the good 
is put to auction which is a non-linear function of the starting price, and a fee once the 
transaction is concluded function of the closing price. Clearly the business model aims at 
boosting the participation of buyers by generating only revenue from suppliers.   
 
 Let us now point to the fact that the above reasoning applies as well to a for-profit 
platform with some variation. The key difference is that when considering whether lowering 
the price for some participants to the platform is profitable or not, the firm will not consider 
the impact on the welfare of participants but the enhanced ability of extracting more revenue 
from other participants. But as pointed above, raising the participation level of side A raises 
also the willingness to pay of members of side B. This can thus be leveraged by charging 
higher fees on side B. In so far as this increase in profits generated on side B is larger than the 
reduced benefits on side A, the firm may be willing to sacrifice the revenue on side A. This 
implies that the profit margins on both sides of the market may differ substantially and not 
reflect the price elasticity of the demand of each side in a conventional way. Moreover the 
effect may be so strong that the firm may end up servicing one side with an apparent loss: the 
price charged will not cover the direct cost of servicing these customers. This apparent 
contradiction can be explained by noticing that there is an "opportunity" gain associated to the 
participation of this group of agents which corresponds to profits on the other side. To build 
on the discussion of the dual nature of customers, subsidized customers are treated more like 
input than like buyers: the platform buys their participation and "resale" it to other clients. 
 
 This is in particular the case for free services that are very common. To give an 
example, ZDNet (www.zdnet.com) a leading information portal on information technologies, 
provides substantive advices and information for free. On the other side it raises revenue from 
advertising and sponsoring. The advertising revenue is directly related to the frequentation of 
the site, justifying the provision of the service for free. Because frequentation is also affected 
by quality, this provides also incentives for ZDNet to provide good quality advices. According 
to this reasoning, the fact that a service is free is by no mean a sign that it is of poor quality.  
 
 Such pricing strategies typically occur for platforms that operate in a competitive 
environment and thus will low profit margin. But even in the case of a monopoly this may 
results in some side being subsidized.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
The tariffs must be assessed globally, accounting for the externalities between participants. 
Efficient price structures involve some form of cross-subsidy between different types of 
participants and may require pricing below cost for some participants or even subsidizing 
their participation.  
 
Indeed when looking at platforms in general, they are many instances where it is 
possible to identify one side of the market as a loss-leader while the platform generates profit 
on the other sides. This is for instance always the case when access to the platform is offered 
for free to one side. 
 As a particular case of this general pattern, the platform may wish to attract some 
customers with direct subsidies, very much like a night club offering not only free entry but 
also free drinks to women. Monetary subsidies raise obvious issues but as we shall see below, 
the platform may offer in kind subsidies that are tailored to the needs of specific customers. 
This type of practice that corresponds to the inclusion of free information services is much 
more common.  
 Given that the prices charged to all sides are inter-related, the main question is then to 
understand which side should be treated more favorably. The answer lies in the reasoning 
followed to explain cross-subsidies. The intellectual exercise involves evaluated the impact of 
rebalancing the tariffs between the two sides of the market. Clearly if side  B attaches a large 
value to an increase in the participation of side A, while members of  side  A doesn't care so 
much, it should be optimal to reduce the fees charged to side  A. As a general principle the 
platform should compare the externalities generated on both side and set relatively lower 
prices where they are perceived to be small.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
Favour a price reduction or a subsidy for the side of the market where members are the less 
subject to participation externalities (smaller benefits derived from the participation of 
members of the opposite side).  
 
 This general principle must be pondered by price sensitivity considerations. Indeed 
when reducing the price on side A, the corresponding increase in prices on side B is directly 
related in the change in volume of participation on side A. This volume is affected by the 
price sensitivity of side A. To give an example, suppose that we start from equal profit on 
each sides and that the platform targets a 1% increase in participation of buyers. Suppose that 
this allows raising the profit on suppliers by 1%. This is profitable only if the profit on buyers 
is reduced by less than 1%, which occurs the reduction of the price-cost margin on buyers is 
less than 2%. Thus price elasticity matters. The more elastic the demand the smaller will be 
the price reduction necessary to achieve a given volume target, and the more incentive there 
will be to boost the participation of the targeted group. Thus the above effect of externalities 
may be mitigated if the price elasticity is lower for the low externality side. This is related to 
but different than the standard analysis of monopoly pricing. In particular this applies also in 
competitive contexts.4
 
Practical Conclusion 
Favour a price reduction for the side of the market where the participation level is the most 
sensitive to the fees charged (high price-elasticity).  
  
 While the main application of these principles concerns balancing the tariffs between 
the two sides of the market, it has also implications for differentiated treatments within one 
side. For instance, if potential suppliers are particularly eager to gain access to a particular 
category of buyers, then the platform may find it optimal to design special offers targeted to 
this category.  
 More generally this points to the fact that customers of platforms will receive much 
contrasted treatments. E-marketplaces should rely extensively on price-discrimination. Cross-
                                                 
4 The reader interested in more details can refer to  Rochet, J.C. and J. Tirole (2003), “Platform Competition in 
Two-Sided Markets”, Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 990–1029, Jullien B. (2005), opuses 
cite, or Armstrong (2002) 
 
subsidy between buyers and suppliers on the platform is just one and the most obvious form 
of such discrimination schemes.  
 Unlike more conventional markets, these price-discrimination schemes need not 
reflect the exercise of market power and be alleviated by competitive pressure. The reason is 
that they are motivated by an efficiency concern: they aim at inducing agents to participate for 
the benefits of other users of the service. This means that unlike other market, one cannot take 
the observation of price-discrimination or the fact that some prices are seemingly below cost 
as a sign that the platform is not facing competition.  
 In traditional output markets, competition puts pressure on prices and tends to align 
them with costs. Firms will reduce the price of any individual product under the pressure of 
competitors, and this process will end when their profit vanishes on each product or services, 
i.e. when prices equal costs. This is not true for platforms as they may be willing to incur a 
loss on one side in order to secure the other side of the market. Thus one cannot treat the 
service sold to firms using a procurement platform for their supply, and the service sold by the 
platforms to suppliers, as two different services sold on distinct market. Even if competition 
reduces overall profits, this concerns the total profits of the platform and this should not result 
in prices equals to the costs of providing the service, for each individual services.  
 Indeed as we have discussed above because the economic decisions of members of a 
platform affect the other users of the platform, prices that reflect marginal costs are not 
efficient. Typically competition will force platforms to try to offer the best services and to be 
efficient. But this requires some subsidies, and in a competitive environment one should 
expect that some services will be sold at prices below costs.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
Competition between platforms raises both the degree of cross-subsidy between sides and the 
tendency to price-discriminate within sides. 
 
 Indeed competition should favor strategies that are referred to in the literature as 
"divide and conquer". These strategies aim at attracting one side of the market through very 
advantageous conditions (divide) and then to generate revenues by charging high prices on the 
other side of the market (conquer). The ability to use these "divide and conquer" strategies 
seems to create much more scope for competition in two-sided market than in other more 
traditional markets with network effects or scale economy. This suggests that even successful 
marketplaces will remain under strong competitive pressure and that markets for e-
procurement may be more contestable than it was thought at the infant stage.  
 
Transaction vs membership fees 
 While the discussion above focuses on the balance between the two sides of the 
market, when the pricing instruments are rich enough, one should consider also other types of 
balancing. It is traditional to distinguish at least two types of fees: membership fees and 
transaction fees. Membership fees, or subscription fees, are typically paid once, and renewed 
at regular intervals, and give the right to access the platform. As we shall discuss below, they 
may also give access to various information services that are not directly related to 
transactions concluded on the platforms (advices, news, electronic tools…). Transaction fees 
are fees that are paid per effective transaction. These fees can be fixed or proportional to the 
price at which the transaction takes place. Their main characteristic is that the total payment is 
affected by the extent of usage of the platforms, measured either by the number of 
transactions or by the value of transactions.5  
 Here the issue when designing the tariffs is a trade-off between inducing efficient 
usage of the platform and income. Membership fees affect the size and the composition of the 
population that will be active during a given period of time on the platform. But for a fix 
population of members, they don't affect the activity on the platform. On the other hand, 
transaction fees affect the activity of members on the platform. When choosing the transaction 
fees, the platform should keep in mind two things. First rebalancing the transaction fees so as 
to improve the usage by a customer indirectly benefits to users on the other side of the market.  
Second a reduction of transaction fees that raises the expected benefits of customers can be 
compensated by a proportional increase in the membership fee paid by this customer.   
 This suggests that membership fees are preferable to transaction fees as candidates for 
raising revenue and balancing the tariffs between the two sides of the market.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
A well established platform with a stable homogeneous clientele and no competition should 
aim at designing transaction fees so as to maximize the volume of trade per member and using 
membership fees as the primary source of profits.  
 
                                                 
5 One could add also fees per item put to sell by suppliers, or items put for tender by buyers.   
 However there are many caveats to this idea. A key issue is that customers may be 
reluctant to pay up-front a membership fee if they are not confident that the quality of the 
service will meet their expectation. In this case, transaction fees provide more insurance to the 
customers, as they anticipate that they will not have to pay if they don't find buyers for their 
products, or a supplier in case of a tendering firm.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
A platform that needs to provide some insurance to its customers should favour financing 
through transaction fees and low membership fees.  
 
Notice that insurance needs may be due to the intrinsic nature of the procurement activity of 
the clients, such as volatile needs, or stem from a lack of reputation of the platform and the 
fear that the service turns to be of poor quality. In particular, newly established procurement 
platforms should rely much more extensively on transaction fees than established ones  
 
As an example illustrating these conclusions, the leading automotive vertical portal, 
Convisint (www.covisint.com), relies on membership fees. But this is not the case of other 
automotive e-procurement services. Partsforindustry (www.partsforindustry.com) is a 
platform that relies most extensively to volume related payment. As of September 2005, it 
charged a 10% commission fee on the final price of any transaction plus a fixed fee per item 
listing (US$ 2.5). In addition the platform proposed options allowing unlimited listing for 
fixed period. The subscription may last from 1 month to 12 month with a degressive 
subscription fee.  
 
A related advantage of payment systems based on transaction fees is that they give 
incentives to the platform to generate a large volume of transaction. A client may fear that if 
he pays only fixed fees, the platform may favor other clients at his expense, either large 
clients or other paying for transaction. Charging a transaction fee is thus a way to commit to 
act in the best interest of the client.  
 A second point illustrated by the example above is that in general the population of 
clients is heterogeneous on both sides. As we have argued above, price discrimination or 
targeted offers are normal and efficient business practices for platforms. When direct 
discrimination is not possible, the platform should rely on indirect mechanisms. An 
alternative will then be to rely on the flexibility offered by complexity of tariffs on 
procurement platforms to achieve such discrimination. One possibility for instance is to tie 
transaction fees to membership fees, but letting suppliers choosing between several pricing 
schemes: suppliers anticipating a large volume of transaction may prefer to pay up-front and 
to have low transaction fees, while others users anticipating few transactions may prefer to be 
charged per transaction. This is a fairly standard practice in industries relying on non-linear 
tariffs (economists refer to such schemes as "second degree price discrimination"). In the 
context of platforms this may be an effective way to raise the level of participation and thus to 
improve efficiency.  
  
Bundling and free services 
 Most information services include complex mix of services. In particular they usually 
involve bundling of services. Bundling refers to the practice of selling several goods together 
in a bundle; it can be pure when goods are only available together, or mixed when the bundle 
goods are available separately. A particular form consists in forcing consumers who buy a 
good A to buy also an alternative good B, referred to as tying.6 Bundling is a common and 
well know phenomenon on Internet that has received considerable attention. One main 
example has been the emergence of large portals such as Yahoo or AOL. Notice that a portal 
like yahoo proposes a BtoC marketplace and an on-line travel agent. Even an initially very 
specialized search service like Google is moving toward integrating various activities. 
Typically e-procurement platforms that rely on membership fees offer a large bundle of 
services to their customers.  
 
 Indeed a typical evolution for e-procurement platforms is to start at small scale and 
then to extend their activity to become an information portal. For example a service like 
Esteel (www.esteel.com) started as a simple matching service for steels suppliers and buyers 
into a large scope vertical portal that offers integrated on-line supply chain management 
solutions to several industries.  
 
 The prominence of bundling in information services relates in part to the fact that 
these services incur very small variable costs. Once a service is designed, the cost is not very 
                                                 
6 For instance, recent anti-trust Microsoft cases were concerned with tying of various programs with windows 
(internet explorer, media player). 
sensitive to the volume of usage.7  Most of the costs of a platform (at least in the short run) 
are fixed costs. The same is true for adding a service, as once the fixed cost of offering the 
service is sunk, the variable cost is very small. This means there is very little cost to offer a 
service to all the population using a platform rather than to a sub-population. In this context, it 
may be more profitable to offer all the services in a bundle with a single total price, than 
setting a price per service and letting customers choose which services they want.8  
 More generally it has long being acknowledged that using various combinations of 
tying and bundling is a way to achieve some form of price-discrimination. For example, 
suppose that there are two types of suppliers using the platform. The suppliers of the first type 
are only interested in listing their product to find clients and can manage all the transactions 
themselves. Suppliers of the second type are also interested in value added services such as 
billing or accounting. Suppose that the platform can't identify the members of each group of 
suppliers. If both services are sold separately, both types of suppliers will pay the same listing 
price. By bundling the value added services and listing, the platform can differentiate the two 
groups. In particular when the listing price is constrained by a low willingness to pay of the 
second type of suppliers, the platform can bundle listing and value added services, and raise 
the price for listing. The interested suppliers (second type) will buy the bundle, but provided 
that the price of the bundle remains above the price for listing alone, suppliers of the first type 
who are only interested by listing will prefer to buy the service alone. Such a mechanism 
allows the platform to raise its price for the first type of suppliers without loosing the 
participation of the second type of suppliers. 
 
  Ariba (www.ariba.com) proposes procurement applications to buyers (“Spend 
Management”) and an access to its e-procurement platform (Ariba Supplier Network) with 
more than 120 000 referenced suppliers. Clearly the initial business model aimed at raising 
revenue from firms seeking procurement solutions and buying applications. On this platform 
suppliers have the option between free access and a subscription based service with support 
and enhanced features, as in the example above. Moreover, until recently access to the 
platform came as a bundle with Ariba’s software. These combinations of value services, price 
discrimination, and bundles have allowed building the network of suppliers, and of buyers. It 
                                                 
7 For software distributed on-line, the variable cost is close to zero. For platform there are costs related to 
computing capacity, congestion and delays, energy. 
8 See Bakos, Y. and E. Brynjolfsson (1999), “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits and Efficiency”, 
Management Science 45(12), 1613–1630. 
 
allows now Ariba to extend its scope: in 2005 Ariba has unbundled the service by launching a 
service providing access to the network to customers not using Ariba Buyer™ software.  
 
 For platforms such as e-marketplaces, bundling may also have a different dimension. 
As was discussed before, efficient pricing rules for platforms may require to subsidy some 
agents. In this context, the ability to offer bundles of information services has several 
advantages. A first point is that monetary subsidies are very difficult to implement. Typically 
individuals who do not intend to use the service at all may claim the subsidy so that 
identifying the right target may be very cumbersome. One alternative is to give the subsidy 
through the form of a free service provided to members of the platforms. Providing a free 
service is de facto equivalent to tying access to services and based intermediation services. To 
the extent that it is only of interest for a specific category of potential users of the platform, 
and not to free-riders, this may be an efficient way to target a subsidy toward this category. 
This applies in particular when the subsidy is targeted to one side of the market. 
 
 
 
Practical Conclusion 
Offering free services may be used as a mean to subsidize the participation of one side. 
 
Second, as we have seen above, the two-sided nature of the market intensifies the 
benefits of using bundles in order to discriminate between users to the benefits of the large.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
Offering free services targeted to specific buyers or suppliers of strategic importance may 
raise efficiency or profit, by improving the ability to discriminate and to coordinate the 
various sides of the market. 
 
 Given that the market for e-procurement may be subject to tipping and be rather 
concentrated, successful e-procurement platforms should devote special care to anti-trust 
issues. Traditional anti-trust analysis of tying emphasizes the fact a motivation for tying may 
be grounded in an attempt to raise barriers to entry. The firm using tying doesn't maximize the 
current profit but this is justified because by limiting entry, it raises its future market power 
which allows recovering this "loss".  From this perspective, the current situation need not be 
viewed as one with dynamic recovering. Costly tying of the services offered to one side of the 
market is justified for the firm by the possibility of instant recovery on the other side of the 
market through higher participation rates. It is clearly a competitive tool that should be used 
by platforms in the contest against other platforms. Moreover it has a rational in terms of 
improved efficiency through better coordination between users of the platform. From an anti-
trust perspective this means that the usual legal standard for exclusionary practices should not 
apply as such to platforms. The same hold true for predatory tests, as a price below variable 
cost for some side of the market (violating the Areeda-Turner rule for predation9) can be 
efficient.  
 Still the treatment of these practices is not settled yet, and platforms with strong 
market power should use these instruments with caution.  
 
Incentive issues 
  Key to the success is the ability to design the platform services and tariffs so that to 
provide adequate incentives to trading partners to contribute and internalize externalities. The 
degree of satisfaction of a user of the service, say of a supplier, depends on the behavior of the 
client it will meet. Typically this buyer will act in a self-interested manner and will not 
account for the fact that misconduct may penalize the platform, as the supplier may decide to 
switch to another platform. This "moral hazard" issue can undermine the functioning of the 
platforms. In the case of procurement platforms, this may take the form of buyers who cancel 
orders or don't pay, and of suppliers who don't deliver, or deliver with long delay or a lower 
quality then announced.  
 This issue of poor quality due to a lack of incentives of the partner in a business 
relationship is the more akin the shortest is the duration of the relationship between the two 
trading parties. Indeed it is known to be one of the benefits of long term relationships, along 
with better coordination and investment is relation specific assets. As moving to an electronic 
marketplace for procurement may imply a larger turnover of suppliers, these institutions are 
particularly sensitive to this issue.  
 
Practical Conclusion 
                                                 
9 Noticing that a firm should not rationally price below marginal costs P.E. Areeda and D.F Turner proposed that 
a price below average variable cost be considered as unlawful, "Predatory Pricing and Related Practice sunder 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act", Harvard Law Review, 88: 697-733.  
The platform should devote special care in monitoring and preventing misconducts by 
participants.  
 
 For instance many procurement platforms rely on a code of good practice that goes 
beyond the mere applications of legal rules. 
Electronic marketplaces have been very imaginative in using the new technologies to 
invent solutions to this problem. The most famous is probably the information feedback 
system that has been used by eBay. Part of the success of eBay has been attributed to its 
ability to overcome quality concerns through adequate and innovative information system.10
 Another example is presented by PriceMinister (www.priceminister.com), a French 
BtoC website. While the transactions are negotiated and concluded by the suppliers and 
buyers, PriceMinister acts as a payment system, receiving the payment from the buyers at the 
time of the order but releasing the payment to the supplier only after confirmation of delivery. 
This mitigates buyers’ opportunism as well as moral hazard issues on supply delays. Still 
PriceMinister relies on a feedback mechanism with grading by buyers to monitor sellers.  
  
This issue of incentive also shade lights on the role of vertical integration. If a firm 
owns shares of a platform it uses for procurement purpose, it has more incentives to maintain 
the profit of this platform and thus to act in the best interest of the platform. Joint ownership 
by key users of the platforms may help to address incentive issues and improve the quality of 
the service offered. 
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